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earlier: The onset is usually dated as August 2007,
with many key events along the way.
For instance, in October 2007, equity prices
actually peaked. The initial reaction by policy-
makers, as well as markets, then, was to view the
crisis as perhaps less severe than it actually turned
out to be. In March 2008, Bear Stearns was pur-
chased by J.P. Morgan with Fed assistance. The
U.S. economy continued to grow through the
second quarter of 2008. We did have a commodity
price spike in the second quarter of 2008: $100
per barrel of West Texas intermediate crude oil
in March. Then the price of oil went up another
$45 from there, which is well above, in real terms,
the 1980 peak in oil prices.
The economy began to slow down in the third
quarter of 2008. And the contracting economy,
both in the United States and abroad, intensified
the financial crisis, which at that point had been
roiling for an entire year. But because the economy
started slowing, the crisis greatly worsened during
the autumn; dozens of firms worldwide required
assistance to avoid bankruptcy in the fourth quar-
ter of 2008. In that quarter and the first quarter of
2009, major economies worldwide contracted.
W
e have been wrestling with one
of the most severe recessions in
the post-World War II era; more-
over, it has been accompanied
by a widespread financial crisis. After unprece-
dented policy responses, there are signs of recov-
ery on both fronts. So, it is not too early to take
stock of our actions and attempt to learn lessons
from our recent past—lessons for monetary policy,
financial regulation, and other aspects of the
crisis. My objective here is to focus on lessons
for monetary policy alone and leave discussion
of regulatory issues and financial markets for
another day.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS 
First, let me explain the nature of the crisis
as I see it. My narrative is a little bit different from
what some people describe, so it’s important that
I establish it before I talk about any lessons to be
learned. I think that history will assert that there
was a panic in the autumn of 2008, and maybe
that’s fair. But this crisis actually began much
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times hear, but it is predicated on the idea that the
crisis had been going on for a long time before the
economy actually started to contract.1
The Monetary Policy Response
Basically, the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy response to the crisis can be divided into
three parts. The first part was a wide array of
collateralized lending programs, which, in my
discussion here, I am going to lump all together
and call liquidity programs. After September 2008,
these were funded by reserve creation—that is, by
printing money. These programs are temporary
in nature, and I don’t view them as an inflationary
threat.
The second part was to move the target policy
interest rate toward zero—in fact, very close to
zero. The Fed was actually very aggressive in
lowering rates during the last part of 2007 into
the first part of 2008.
The third part of the policy response was an
aggressive asset purchase program. I’m going to
put this topic under the title “quantitative easing.”
This response was also funded by reserve creation,
like the liquidity programs, but in this case the
balance sheet effects are far more persistent. I
think that this program creates a medium-term
inflation threat in a way that the liquidity pro-
grams do not.  I will continue this discussion in
the next section.
THREE LESSONS
I will focus on three lessons for monetary
policy that have emerged from recent events:
They have to do with understanding that (i) the
role of lender of last resort can be carried out on
a grand scale; (ii) quantitative easing can substi-
tute for policy rate easing after the zero bound is
encountered; and (iii) the connections between
asset pricing and monetary policy must be a top
priority going forward.
Lesson 1: Lender of Last Resort on a
Grand Scale
My first lesson is about the Fed’s role as lender
of last resort on a grand scale. So what is the les-
son? It is that the Fed’s ability to act decisively
in a crisis through its lender-of-last-resort func-
tion far outstrips previous conventional wisdom.
I think that the response has been more creative
and much more substantial than people would
have imagined: If you had a conference before the
crisis to discuss the lender-of-last-resort function,
I don’t think the recent actions by the Fed would
have been predicted.
Going forward, I think that these liquidity
programs need to be carefully evaluated. That’s
a call for our research community to study them
closely, and John Taylor has been a leader in
analyzing the effectiveness and implications of
these programs (Taylor and Williams, 2008, 2009).
One concern is that the scale of these liquidity
programs may unintentionally be setting up expec-
tations of future intervention, and I believe we
need to think carefully about that. How are markets
expecting we’re going to react in future crises? Is
that something we desire or not? And how should
we account for that?
The lender-of-last-resort function—lending
extensively in response to a crisis—has been an
integral part of central banking for the past 200,
maybe 300 years. It is all collateralized lending,
and the basic premise is that it is necessary to
provide a lot of liquidity to markets in the event
of a crisis.
The Fed was very innovative in this area.
We developed a wide array of liquidity programs
in 2007-08 that were all designed to improve mar-
ket functioning. These programs were always
meant to be temporary in nature and are therefore
priced in such a way that markets will not find
them attractive once the crisis passes. And that
is happening now on a large scale: As market
functioning improves, these programs become
less necessary.
Some of these programs are within the Fed’s
traditional purview; some were authorized under
the so-called 13(3) provision in the Federal Reserve
Act, which allows the Fed to lend to other parties
Bullard
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1 This episode has been described as the “perfect storm”: In sum,
the financial crisis began in 2007—exacerbated by the spike in
commodity prices in the first half of 2008—and the economic
slowdown revealed itself in the autumn of 2008, at which time
panic ensued worldwide.in unusual and exigent circumstances. It’s a wide
variety, but all programs are intended to improve
market functioning. Some may have worked better
than others, of course, and so we should evaluate
these programs carefully. As we do that, we
should keep in mind that, simultaneous to the
Fed’s collateralized lending, many government
guarantees were coming into play. As future
research addresses this topic, it will be essential
to evaluate the effect of the government guarantees
in tandem with the effect of providing liquidity
to the markets.
But regardless of how these individual pro-
grams perform, by many metrics they are con-
sidered an overall success. Although we’re not
completely back to pre-crisis levels, global finan-
cial markets are less strained than they were.
Figure 1 shows a familiar picture: the LIBOR-OIS
spread dating back to January 2007. Again, the
crisis started in earnest in August 2007, the point
at which this LIBOR-OIS spread jumps up. That
jump was actually considered gigantic at the time,
although it turned out to be relatively small, as
events unfolded in the autumn of 2008.
These spreads have decreased substantially,
even though they are not back to where they were
during the first half of 2007.2 This reversal is often
attributed to the liquidity programs. You could
argue about it, but I think the point is that the
liquidity programs, as a pillar of the monetary
policy response to the crisis, are certainly being
used a lot less intensively today than they were
even six months ago. The Fed’s core idea is to let
these programs continue to wind down naturally
and to end the authority of the 13(3) provision
for emergency programs in 2010.
Figure 2 shows the volume of reserves supplied
to financial firms and markets through liquidity
facilities. The peak exceeds $1.6 trillion. This is
what I meant by “lender of last resort on a grand
scale.” On September 11, 2001, we had about
$40 billion of reserves in the system and we almost
doubled that to about $75 billion.3 At the time,
we thought that was a gigantic sum. But this recent
level of $1.6 trillion of lending to firms and mar-
kets in response to this crisis is truly a monumental
attempt to alleviate liquidity constraints in the
markets and to get past this crisis—and one metric
for measuring how large this crisis really was.
Bullard
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2 In fact, these spreads are quite close, with the exception of the 
6-month spread. 

















NOTE: Data are through January 25, 2010.
SOURCE: Financial Times and Reuters.Again, these programs are priced to be unat-
tractive in normal circumstances, which is why
they have declined so rapidly from their peak of
$1.6 trillion to under $300 billion. Firms do not
want to use these programs unless they really need
them. The expectation is that these programs will
cease to exist by the first quarter of 2010 if finan-
cial conditions continue to improve; at that point,
the Fed’s short-term lending to ensure liquidity
will return to a minimal level.
This lesson, then, is that these programs are
much larger and more varied than could have been
anticipated before the crisis. It is time to evaluate
which ones worked and which ones didn’t and
to think much more carefully about the ramifica-
tions of the lender-of-last-resort policy, which has
not often been as prominent a topic in the research
world as other aspects of monetary policy. We
also need to assess whether we have unwittingly
set up expectations of future intervention that
could be influencing markets today.
Lesson 2: The Several Faces of
Monetary Policy
The United States has not had policy rates at
(or essentially at) zero since the 1930s. Yet, even
in this current environment, the Fed has not ceased
to function. The second lesson is that monetary
policy can be conducted by different means.
Normally, we think of monetary policy as interest
rate adjustment, but when you reach the zero
bound in nominal interest rates, you have to adjust
monetary policy in other dimensions and that’s
exactly what the Fed has done. There may have
been some doubt—before this recent episode—
about the ability of the Fed to conduct a business
Bullard
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Figure 2
Short-Term Lending to Financial Firms and Markets
NOTE: Data are through January 10, 2010. MMIFF, Money Market Investor Funding Facility; TALF, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, H.4.1.cycle stabilization policy with policy rates near
zero. But I think this episode clearly reveals that
the Fed is perfectly capable of doing so.
In my opinion, analogous to interest rate policy,
quantitative policy should be state contingent;
that is, it should adjust according to incoming
information on the state of the economy. And
these types of policy do have some relation to
each other. Although they are different, I think
that any quantitative policy should be conducted
in a manner that’s analogous to interest rate policy.
To me, that means adjusting the policy according
to incoming information. 
Since its March 17-18, 2009, meeting, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has
explicitly stated that it will keep the federal funds
rate target near zero for an “extended period.”
Any movement away from that position will be
contingent on both inflation and real economic
developments. But my question is this: How
should the FOMC conduct business cycle stabili  -
zation policy during the period of near-zero pol-
icy rates? And the answer is that there are many
interest rates and many assets that the Fed can
influence.
The FOMC communicated its plans to make
more than $1.7 trillion in outright asset purchases
in a series of announcements beginning about
December 2008. The purchases are agency debt
(in this case, “agency” means Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac), agency mortgage-backed securities
(MBS), and longer-term Treasury securities. The
bulk of these purchases are agency MBS. Again,
this is being financed by reserve creation, or print-
ing money. Consequently, the monetary base has
more than doubled, creating a medium-term infla-
tion risk.
This point deserves some illumination.
Accord  ing to monetary theory, very large increases
in the monetary base are inflationary. And the
inflationary effects of very large increases in the
monetary base depend on at least two factors:
One factor is private sector expectations of the
future level of the monetary base. As always, in
macroeconomics and monetary theory, expecta-
tions are very important. With large increases
that are expected to be temporary, as they are with
the liquidity programs, I don’t believe there is
much of an inflationary threat. But large increases
in the monetary base that are expected to be per-
manent—or at least more persistent—may indeed
be inflationary. Increases in the monetary base
that are associated with asset purchases fall into
this more-persistent category, which is why this
aspect of current policy poses a medium-term
inflation risk.
The second factor that would affect the
medium-term inflation risk is the speed with
which the increases in the monetary base translate
into increases in the  money supply. The monetary
base is not the money supply: Before monetary
increases can affect inflation, the “money” must
be incorporated into ordinary transactions. That
is not occurring right now; the speed with which
the monetary base is being translated into changes
in the money supply is very slow at this point.
This often happens when the economy slows down
as rapidly as the U.S. economy has. But we can
expect that this process will start to accelerate and
that may affect the medium-term inflation risk.
Figure 3 shows the Fed’s balance sheet in a
particularly instructive way. The area above the
black line is a duplication of Figure 2: the total
volume of the liquidity programs. As I said pre-
viously, that component of the balance sheet is
not worrisome; it does not create a medium-term
inflation risk. 
The dark blue area below the black line shows
the more traditional holdings of the Federal
Reserve, such as Treasury securities, and the
light blue area under the black line is the MBS
purchase program, which has grown very large.
The dotted black line projects how this part of
the balance sheet will continue to grow through
the first quarter of 2010. Under current conditions,
the size of the balance sheet will increase to about
$2.4 trillion. And again, unlike the liquidity pro-
grams, these purchases will not run off in a period
of months because these assets have much longer
maturities: seven to ten years. In this case, we’re
talking about mortgages. And so we would expect
this expansion of the monetary base, then, to be
much more persistent and not likely to dissipate
in a timely fashion.
Moving on to the asset purchases as quanti-
tative easing: Again, the FOMC moved its policy
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after that began this asset purchase program—in
fact, in the first month of 2009. I think that this
program has been regarded as successful, as it
further eased monetary conditions after the zero
bound was encountered. So in some sense, the
asset purchase program substituted for additional
easing that could not be done through the policy
rates, since the policy rate had come very close
to zero. So a natural way to run monetary policy
going forward would be for the FOMC to continue
to adjust the asset purchase program while the
policy rate remains near zero.
I like to think of asset purchases in terms of
state-contingent policy. When we adjust interest
rates, we always do so in response to economic
conditions: readings on inflation and on the real
economy. The famous Taylor rule is one example
of that, but there are many other examples, and
it’s a natural way for the central bank to operate.
The asset purchase program that we have in
place right now does not have this state-contingent
character. What we on the FOMC did as a com-
mittee is simply announce that $1.725 billion of
assets would be purchased by the first quarter of
2010. I don’t see anything optimal about simply
announcing a number and buying that amount of
assets. It may be helpful for monetary policy going
forward to think more in terms of adjusting this
program as macroeconomic information arrives.
That’s what you would do with the Taylor rule.
Although there’s no guarantee at this point that
current quantitative policy will become state-
contingent, it seems to me if you’re going to have
two policy instruments in place, you should have
them operate in the same fashion: both adjusted
in response to incoming information.
And, with the policy rate near zero, the asset
purchase program could very easily dominate
policy for some time. In fact, I suggest staying
active in the market for agency MBS. If encourag-
ing information on the economy arrives after the
first quarter of 2010, then we could consider
Bullard
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, H.4.1.removing some accommodation through asset
sales. We certainly wouldn’t want to do that in
blanket fashion; this is all about adjustments at
the margin, so you’d adjust a little bit through
asset sales. On the other hand, if discouraging
economic news came in, then you could consider
additional asset purchases. This would allow
monetary policy to remain active, responding to
shocks during the period of near-zero interest rates.
Figure 4 shows a timeline. Traditional policy
rate adjustment, as it’s been practiced in the United
States and around the world over the past 20 to 25
years and maybe quite a bit longer than that, is
noted on the left side. The liquidity programs
appear beneath and extend from October 2008
until the first quarter of 2010—February or March
2010. These liquidity programs were a response
to the crisis, but they are set off to the side because
they’re not part of the traditional policy response
or an attempt to run stabilization policy. Once the
rate approached zero in December of 2008, we
began our large-scale asset purchase program,
which is shown as continuing through March
2010. The timeline then shows a period with
some question marks that refers to the extended
period language that the FOMC has adopted.
And as I said, we will continue to keep rates low
for an extended period, and what we do in the
future will depend on how the data come in on
the economy.
But during this period, you could also adjust
your asset purchases in one direction or the other
as information arrives, perhaps before you want
to make a decision on the interest rate margin.
And then at some point down the road—and I’m
being very cagey here, by putting a question mark
on that point—you’d make a decision on the
interest rate; you’d return to a traditional policy
rate adjustment and would go on from there. So
this is just a suggestion about how to think about
policy in 2010 and beyond.
In summary, the asset purchase program is
very large. It is being financed by reserve creation—
i.e., printing money. It is generally considered
successful. And it has substituted for easing that
cannot be accomplished through the policy rate.
Longer-term interest rates generally fell as aspects
of the program were communicated in Chairman
Bernanke’s announcements in late 2008 and then
in further announcements in the first part of 2009.
And I think that the FOMC could use the program
to respond to incoming information on the econ-
omy during the period of near-zero interest rates.
Lesson 3: Bubbles
The third lesson is about asset price “bubbles.”
(I’m placing bubbles in quotation marks because
I’m trying to exorcise the bubble language. I have
been unable to do it so far.) It is a very serious
Bullard
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Timeline of Monetary Policyissue for monetary policy and has been debated
extensively over the past 15 years. But now we
are having a renewed and more intense debate.
The main problem in thinking about this issue
appears to me to be that it is hard to see what was
wrong with the previous policy, given conven-
tional ideas about what we attempt to accomplish
with policy.
We have had two decades with two bubbles.
The first one was in the 1990s, and the second
one was in the current decade. In both cases, after
the 1991 recession, and again after the 2001 reces-
sion, we had jobless recoveries; and it took a long
time before the Fed decided to raise rates and
come off their cyclical lows in either of those
cases. In the 1990s we had the so-called “dot-com
bubble.” In the 2000s we had the “housing bubble,”
and the drag on the economy from the housing
decline has been really severe since 2006.
Despite this, the monetary policy outcomes
during the past two decades—up to the current
recession—actually have been quite good. Unem  -
ployment hit lows of 3.8 percent and 4.4 percent,
respectively. In the current decade, inflation has
been low and stable. In terms of the conventional
ideas about what monetary policy tries to accom-
plish, those years were quite good. Still, even
without an increase in inflation, the asset price
misalignment seemed to have caused significant
problems for the macroeconomy, and that may
mean that we should put more weight on asset
prices going forward.
Now, there has been debate on this, and this
is my final point. There is a policy debate on this
topic and there is an academic debate. The policy
debate has made good points: that it is difficult
to identify asset price misalignments in real time
and that interest rates are a blunt instrument to
respond to asset price misalignments. I think not
all bubbles are bad. Consider the “tech bubble”
of the 1990s. A lot of good technology was devel-
oped then, even though it seemed to be an asset
price misalignment. And this is what the policy
debate has said.
There is also an academic literature on this
issue, and it generally does not come into the
policy discussion. The literature is about multi-
ple equilibria: There is a set of expectations and
a set of prices that will clear markets, but there is
another set of expectations and another set of
prices that will also clear markets. And, as
described in the literature, the objective is to
adopt a policy to quash these multiple equilibria
so that you’re left with only the fundamental
equilibrium. At that point, the economy will
bounce along according to the actual shocks that
hit the economy. 
In my mind, this is a more sophisticated way
to think about “asset bubbles” and how to respond
to them. According to this literature, one example
of a policy that works fairly well is for monetary
policy to react aggressively to shocks. If this is
done, then multiple equilibria—specifically, those
that are not based on fundamentals—are discarded
and the economy is kept near its fundamental
equilibrium. I interpret that as the best policy to
follow to avoid problems with bubbles.
So if we approach this issue seriously and
intensify this debate further, we may have to enter-
tain these sorts of ideas and step up our analysis
of this issue.
CONCLUSION
The recent crisis has been challenging, to say
the least. But we have the opportunity to evaluate
our responses and the effects of those responses.
To sum up: The first lesson is that the lender-of-
last-resort function has proven much more flexible
and more powerful than previously believed. The
second lesson is that the asset purchase program
has shown that active stabilization policy is pos-
sible with the policy rate at zero. And the third
lesson is that clearly the issue of “asset price
bubbles” is a hard one for monetary policy and
may require new and innovative analysis.
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